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ABSTRACT

This essay examines the impact of the Brown decision on both the relative educational attainments and relative earnings of blacks and whites. On the basis of the available data, it argues that the Brown decision had a powerful effect on improving the economic status of blacks, although only a portion of that improvement was attained through more equal schooling. Rather, Brown seemed to legitimate the case for equality and initiate the rise of black political activism, further legal challenges to racial discrimination in voting, employment, education, and housing, and the creation of a favorable climate for the passage of subsequent civil rights legislation and the War on Poverty. (Author/JM)

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

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EDUCATION AND EARNINGS OF BLACKS AND THE *BROWN* DECISION

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EDUCATION AND EARNINGS OF BLACKS AND THE *BROWN* DECISION

Abstract

In 1954 the U.S. Supreme Court handed down the famous Brown decision declaring that racially separated schools are unconstitutional. A substantial portion of the decision argued that the schools represent an important determinant of life chances, and therefore discrimination in education is likely to handicap blacks in their quest for occupational status and income. This essay examines the impact of Brown on both the relative educational attainments and earnings of blacks and whites. On the basis of the available data it argues that the Brown decision had a powerful effect on improving the economic status of blacks, although only a portion of that improvement was attained through more equal schooling. Rather, Brown seemed to have had its greatest impact on legitimating the case for equality and initiating the rise of black political activism, the further legal challenges to racial discrimination in voting, employment, education, and housing, and the creation of a favorable climate for the passage of the subsequent civil rights legislation and the War on Poverty.

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Education and Earnings of Blacks and the *Brown* Decision

HENRY M. LEVIN

Introduction

In May, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its well-known decision in the case of *Brown* v. *Board of Education*.[1] That decision declared that segregated schools are inherently unequal and that when racial segregation results from state laws, those laws are unconstitutional and must be struck down. Since that date, scholars have taken a great interest in the consequences and meaning of *Brown*. In particular, *Brown* has stimulated numerous studies of the extent and process of desegregation,[2] of the impact of desegregation on scholastic achievement and attitudes and on migration,[3] of the role of social science evidence in the judicial process,[4] and of the limits or potential of the courts to serve as an agent of social change.[5]

In contrast there has been much less attention devoted to the impact of *Brown* on improving more generally the educational and economic attainments of black Americans. This is somewhat surprising because the Court argued:

> Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education in our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public re-

sponsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is the principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

Presumably the Court was assuming that a movement toward greater equality in the educational setting between blacks and whites would initiate a process of equalization in life chances for success between the two groups. Certainly, if *Brown* improved the quality of schooling for blacks relative to whites, it might reasonably be expected that the relative occupational achievements and earnings of blacks would also improve.

But *Brown* did much more than this. *Brown* set the stage for the ensuing rise in black political activism, for legal challenges to racial discrimination in voting, employment, and education, as well as for the creation of a favorable climate for the passage of the subsequent civil rights legislation and the initiation of the War on Poverty. Perhaps even more noteworthy was the role that *Brown* played in creating the overall legitimacy of the black cause, with major changes occurring in the attitudes of both black and white Americans and in the racial conduct of our institutional life. While the narrower effects of *Brown* on economic equity might be addressed through an analysis of the extent and effects of school desegregation on the earnings of the races, such a picture would be very incomplete. Rather, it is necessary to explore the broader impact of *Brown* on the very climate of race relations and its impetus in setting in motion a wider range of social and political movements in behalf of black Americans. To the degree that these broader effects have shaped both the pro-

vision of education and the translation of education and other factors into economic results, it is likely that they had had an effect considerably broader than school desegregation.

In the following pages we will examine the possible impact of *Brown* on the relative educational and economic status of black Americans. First, we will examine racial differences in education from the pre-*Brown* period to the present. Second, we will inspect the changes in earnings differentials between whites and blacks. Third, we will attempt to evaluate alternative explanations for the black-white trends in education and earnings. In the final sections we will examine the impact of *Brown* from a more general perspective in order to speculate on its possible effects beyond those associated only with alterations of the racial composition of schools. In general, it will be argued that the role of *Brown* in improving the educational, economic, and political status of black Americans can only be understood within this larger framework.

Racial Differences in Educational Attainments

Before it is possible to speculate on the impact of *Brown* on changes in the relative educational patterns and earnings of blacks and whites, it is necessary to establish the nature of those patterns. The purpose of this section is to provide a brief historical picture of changes in educational attainments according to race. The next section will provide a parallel presentation for earnings. Many of the data that will be presented will refer only to males of each race. The reason for this restriction is due to the regularity of male labor market behavior over the life cycle in contrast with that of females. Differences in behavior between the races among females with respect to their labor force participation tend to inhibit a useful comparison of relative earnings. However, it should be noted that the restriction of the analysis to males is attributible only to this criterion of practicality. Applying a similar

analysis to females would encounter a number of obstacles that would require the establishment of controversial and highly arbitrary assumptions to provide comparability.

YEARS OF SCHOOLING COMPLETED.[9] One of the most important measures of educational attainment is the number of years of schooling completed. It is useful to examine the patterns for this measure of educational attainment at different points in history. Table 1 shows the estimated years of schooling for U.S.

TABLE 1 Estimated Years of Schooling of U.S. Males by Year of Birth, 1973

Year of Birth	Age in 1973	Black	Other (excluding hispanics)	Difference
1947–1951	22–26	11.9	13.0	1.1
1937–1946	27–36	11.4	12.9	1.5
1927–1936	37–46	10.1	12.2	2.1
1917–1926	47–56	8.6	11.6	3.0
1907–1916	57–66	7.1	10.6	3.5

SOURCE: Hauser and Featherman, "Equality of Schooling: Trends and Prospects," 110.

males, by year of birth, for 1973. In this table, a comparison is made between blacks and a category called "other" males, excluding hispanics. The latter category does include some nonblack and nonhispanic minorities, but it is overwhelmingly white (probably over 95 percent). Thus, the comparison between the black and the "other" group in Table 1 can be thought of as a black-white comparison. The classification according to year of birth enables us to view the differences in education among persons of different ages, so that we can observe the historical differences in schooling completed between the two racial groupings among their surviving members.

Two very important patterns emerge from these data. First, there seems to be a rather pronounced convergence in educa-

tional attainments between the races among young males relative to older ones. While younger members of both groups have experienced increases in schooling in comparison with their older counterparts, the difference in the average amount of schooling between races has declined from about 3.5 years in the oldest group to slightly more than one year in the youngest. That is, younger black and white males tend to look more alike in terms of their average amount of schooling than older ones. This leads to the second conclusion, that even among younger males there is still a substantial difference in educational attainments. To get some idea of the magnitude of the difference, black males in their midtwenties have about the same level of education as "other" males in their midforties. Stated another way, young blacks in 1973 were obtaining about the same amount of schooling as young whites had obtained some two decades before.

The same type of convergence is observed when we examine estimates of the amount of schooling completed at the time of labor market entry as shown in Table 2. As we would expect,

TABLE 2 Years of School Completed at Estimated Time of Labor Market Entry, for Males, 1930–1970

Item	Year of Labor Market Entry				
	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970
Mean schooling of blacks	5.9	8.0	9.9	11.1	11.4
Mean schooling of whites	9.6	11.1	12.0	12.6	12.6
Proportion of blacks with less than 9 years of school	.78	.58	.31	.15	.11
Proportion of whites with less than 9 years of school	.42	.22	.15	.10	.07
Proportion of blacks with more than 12 years of school	.03	.07	.13	.19	.19
Proportion of whites with more than 12 years of school	.08	.20	.32	.37	.38

SOURCE: Smith and Welch, *Race Differences in Earnings: A Survey and New Evidence*, 10.

some persons who enter the labor market have not completed their schooling, a factor that probably explains the relatively lower values for comparably aged males in Table 2 in comparison with those in Table 1. Again, we observe a converging pattern of attainments over the period of analysis, with both groups increasing their schooling at the time of labor market entry. While the average schooling of white labor market entrants was more than 3.5 years greater than for their black counterparts in 1930, the difference had declined to little more than a year by 1970. However, even in 1970 the average amount of schooling completed by black labor market entrants was only slightly better than that of whites entering the labor market in 1940. Further, although about 38 percent of white labor market entrants had achieved more than twelve years of schooling in 1970, only 19 percent of blacks had achieved this level. Thus, the black figure for 1970 had risen only as high as the proportion of whites with twelve years or more of schooling for 1940.

In at least one respect the gap between blacks and whites has not narrowed in recent years. The proportion of the black population 25–34 years of age who completed at least four years of college rose from about 4.1 percent in 1960 to about 8.1 percent in 1974. However, the comparable figures for whites in the same age group were 11.9 percent in 1960 and 21 percent in 1974.[7] These changes in college completion rates between the two races meant that the white advantage rose from about eight percentage points in 1960 to about a thirteen percentage point difference by 1974.

But, in general, the data suggest that both black and white educational attainments have risen, with average black attainments improving at a faster rate than white ones. The result of these trends has been a rather constant dimunition of the black-white educational gap. This convergence in educational attainments between the races should not make us lose sight of the fact that the average amount of schooling completed by blacks

is still at that level completed by whites some two or three decades ago.

EQUALITY OF THE SCHOOLING EXPERIENCE. A major concern of *Brown* was the inequality of schooling experiences between blacks and whites. Presumably differences in the quality of schooling affect life chances in two ways. First, higher quality educational experiences could lead to the attainment of more schooling if those experiences improve the preparation of students for being admitted to and succeeding in subsequent levels of schooling. Second, better quality schooling could improve the preparation of students for employment and other postschooling opportunities at each level of education. That is, it is reasonable to believe that better schools increase cognitive skills and inculcate values and attitudes that are associated with higher occupational and economic attainments.

While it is not possible to explore directly the quality of the schooling experience between blacks and whites over the historical past because of a lack of data, it is possible to compare the schools that blacks and whites attended according to certain characteristics that are thought to be important educationally.[8] For example, Table 3 compares the average amount of instruction for each year of schooling by examining the length of the school year and the attendance rates of pupils by race. Up until 1953–1954, the data are divided according to "black schools" and "all schools." The black schools are those which were segregated in the dual school systems of the South. For the year 1965–1966 the data are taken from the landmark survey of *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, more commonly known as the Coleman Report.[9] These data correspond to the characteristics of schools attended by the average white or average black elementary school pupil in the sample, regardless of the racial composition of the school attended.

It is very clear that up until about 1950, the black schools had substantially shorter annual sessions than did schools as a whole

TABLE 3 School Term and Attendance for Black and White Students, 1919–1955

	1919–20	1929–30	1939–40	1949–50	1953–54	1965–66
Average Number of Days Schools in Session						
a) Black schools	119	132	156	173	177	—
b) All schools	162	173	175	178	179	—
c) Elementary schools attended by average black	—	—	—	—	—	180
d) Elementary schools attended by average white	—	—	—	—	—	179
Percent of Pupils in Average Daily Attendance						
a) Black schools	67	72	80	85	85	—
b) All schools	75	83	87	89	89	—
c) Schools attended by average black	—	—	—	—	—	93
d) Schools attended by average white	—	—	—	—	—	95

SOURCE: Compiled by Welch, "Black-White Returns to Schooling," 900 from various issues of U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Biennial Survey of Education* for 1919–20 to 1953–54. Data for 1965–66 are taken from Coleman, *et al.*, *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, Supplemental Appendix, 1966.

in the United States. To a large degree this pattern conformed with the needs for black farm labor and the length of the growing season in the rural South. As blacks moved from rural to urban areas and as the states standardized the length of the school session, the two patterns tended to converge. The 1949–1954 period shows little difference between races on this measure, and the 1965–1966 Coleman data are almost identical for the two groups. A similar convergence is found for the rate of attendance for white and black students. The percentage of students in average daily attendance rose for both groups, with a more rapid rise for black students and a tendency toward convergence. Although there was an eight to eleven percentage point difference in this measure in favor of whites in the 1920–1930 data, there was only a two percentage point difference in 1965–1966 with attendance rates having risen for both groups substantially.

The convergence of schooling characteristics is also evident in an examination of patterns of remuneration of instructional staff and of instructional expenditures in Table 4. The early salary data suggest that teachers in segregated black schools were receiving considerably lower salaries than those in southern white schools. By 1965–1966, the Coleman data suggest, salary levels of instructional staff in the South and for the country as a whole were similar between schools attended by the average white and black student.

Since much of the difference in school expenditures is determined by salary levels, it is not surprising to find that school expenditures followed a similar pattern, particularly for schools in the South. In 1931–1932 the average per-pupil expenditure in black schools was only about one-third of that of southern white schools, and even the latter was only about one-half the national average. By the time of the *Brown* decision, the average per-pupil expenditure in black schools had risen to about 60 percent of that in southern white schools, and the expenditure in the latter schools was about two-thirds of the national average. According to the

TABLE 4 Average Instructional Salaries and Expenditures for Negro and White Students, 1919–1966

	1919–20	1929–30	1939–40	1949–50	1953–54	1965–66[c]
Average Salary Per Instructional Staff Member						
a) Black schools	$ —	$ —	$ 601	$ 2143	$ 2861	—
b) Southern white schools	—	—	1046	—	3384	—
c) All schools	871	1420	1441	3010	3285	—
d) Average black student in South	—	—	—	—	—	$ 5221
e) Average white student in South	—	—	—	—	—	5053
f) Average black student	—	—	—	—	—	6121
g) Average white student	—	—	—	—	—	6155
Current Expenditure Per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance						
a) Black schools	$ —	$ 15[a]	$ 19	$ —	$ 110[b]	—
b) Southern white schools	—	49[a]	59	—	181[b]	—
c) All schools	—	87	88	209	265	—
d) Average black student in South	—	—	—	—	—	$ 293
e) Average white student in South	—	—	—	—	—	287
f) Average black student	—	—	—	—	—	386
g) Average white student	—	—	—	—	—	427

[a] Refers to 1931–1932. [b] Instructional expenses only. [c] Elementary level.

SOURCE: Compiled by Welch "Black-White Returns to Schooling," 900 from various issues of U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, *Biennial Survey of Education* for 1919–20 to 1953–54. Data for 1965–66 are taken from Coleman, *et al.*, *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, Supplemental Appendix, 1966.

Coleman data, the average current educational expenditures for black students in elementary schools in the South had risen to about the same level as that for whites by 1965–1966. There was still a difference in favor of whites, though, on a national level.

That lower instructional salaries and expenditures for black pupils were translated into poorer quality educational services is documented by Horace Mann Bond and others. Bond reported on the rather dismal educational provisions that blacks faced in the 1930s. The data collected by Bond and those available from other sources are consistent in showing that black schools typically had poorer physical plants, fewer staff relative to enrollments, inadequate instructional materials, and less-qualified teachers than did the white schools. For example, while about 60 percent of teachers in the white schools of the South had at least four years of college in 1939–1940, only about one-third of teachers in the black schools had this level of preparation. In Mississippi the disparity was greater with 62 percent for the white schools and 9 percent for the black ones.[10]

The pattern of educational resources between schools serving blacks and whites seems to have been one of large divergences in favor of whites up to the thirties, with a rapid convergence towards equality by the fifties and sixties. Whether the tendency toward equality suggested by the Coleman data is accurate is a matter of some controversy. For example, the Coleman data for school expenditures have been questioned because they are based on school district averages that mask differences among schools within a district.[11] To the degree that higher salaried teachers and more of other resources were being allocated to those schools with predominantly white enrollments within school districts, the school district averages would not uncover the true inequalities favoring white students. Studies of intradistrict school resource allocation in Chicago and in Washington, D.C., in the sixties found that expenditures were higher in schools attended by whites.[12] Further, an extensive reanalysis of Coleman data for the

large cities found that the per-pupil expenditures on teachers' salaries were directly related to the proportion of whites enrolled in the school.[13]

Nevertheless, a large number of resources in the Coleman study were measured on a school-by-school basis, and most of these suggest a general parity between schools attended by whites and blacks. With the possible exception of teacher race and teacher verbal score, there did not appear to be significant differences in resources in the original Coleman analysis or in the subsequent reanalysis.[14] However, there may still have existed important differences in school expenditures favoring whites within large cities, and on a national basis the Coleman data suggest that school expenditures for the average white student exceeded those of the average black student by about 10 percent.

There have been no systematic studies of school characteristics, by race, that would enable us to ascertain what has happened in the last decade. Since 1965–1966, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act has provided compensatory education expenditures for children from low-income backgrounds, and the states have provided such programs too. These programs would likely have an equalizing effect on educational expenditures between blacks and whites, because a higher proportion of black students are from families that meet the criteria for eligibility. However, there is considerable evidence that local school districts have substituted compensatory educational funds in place of support that would have been provided from state and local sources.[15] Thus, the degree of equalization or even the possibility of higher spending for blacks for such funding is not possible to ascertain. Many of the states have been pressed by the courts to provide fairer systems of state educational finance among districts.[16] To the degree that higher proportions of blacks live in those districts that will benefit most from the new arrangements, there may be a recent tendency towards greater parity for black students. Finally, the general diffusion of black college students from the traditional black colleges

to a broader range of colleges and universities has probably had the effect of improving the quality of instruction for black college students in the last fifteen years. The majority of the black colleges were struggling and underfinanced alternatives to the white-segregated systems of higher education that typified the South and border states.[17] While they served a very important and heroic role in providing postsecondary opportunities for black youth who were neglected by other institutions, their material poverty has been a tremendous handicap in providing first-rate instructional opportunities.[18]

A final indicator of the quality of the schooling experience for blacks is the degree to which their education has taken place in a desegregated environment.

The historical pattern of school segregation and desegregation for the United States has really been two different patterns, one for the North and one for the South. At the time of the *Brown* decision, laws of some seventeen southern and border states as well as the District of Columbia required segregated schools. Until the end of World War II a number of other states practiced school segregation as well. In the decade following *Brown*, very little progress was made in the South towards desegregation. The Supreme Court did not rule on how desegregation was to be implemented until the second *Brown* decision in 1955. That edict declared that desegregation should take place under the jurisdiction of federal district courts "with all deliberate speed," and it permitted delays if local school boards could "establish that such time is necessary in the public interest."[19]

Even without this basis for delay, the states and local school districts that were affected by *Brown* tried all kinds of ploys and circumventions to avoid the implementation of *Brown*. The decade from 1954 to 1964 was a decade of recalcitrance and noncompliance by southern school authorities, with the greatest resistance in the states of the Deep South. In 1964, only about 9 percent of the 3.4 million students in the southern and border

states were attending desegregated schools, and only 1.2 percent of the students in the eleven states of the South were enrolled in desegregated schools.[20] By 1968 the situation had improved substantially, as reflected in Table 5, which shows the racial composition for schools attended by blacks from 1968–1972. In 1968, some 18 percent of black pupils in the South were in such schools.

In contrast, the post-1954 years saw the development increasingly in the North and West of migration patterns of whites from central cities to suburbs and blacks from the rural South to the cities of the North and South. These migration patterns created heavy concentrations of blacks and other minorities in the northern cities, so that the enrollments of the large city schools began to reflect these racial compositions. Further, often blacks resided in "ghettos" far removed from the white areas of the cities and school districts, so that neighborhood schools were far more segregated than even the overall composition of population might reflect. For 1965 the Coleman survey found that the average black sixth-grader was in a school in which over three-quarters of the students were black.[21]

Moreover, the tendency towards greater racial concentration in the schools of the North was portended by a continuing outflow of whites from the cities, partially a response to efforts made to desegregate the city schools through busing and the use of other approaches.[22] As Table 5 indicates, in 1968 only about 28 percent of black students in the thirty-two states of the North and West were attending schools with minority enrollments of less than 50 percent. But by 1970, the progress in the South had created a higher level of desegregation in the South than in the North. Although individual northern districts had engaged in desegregation efforts, others were becoming more segregated over time. Thus, the overall picture did not change appreciably between 1968 and 1972.

While the schools of the South have experienced extensive desegregation over the last decade or so, the schools of the North

TABLE 5 Black School Enrollment by Geographic Area

Geographic Area	Total Pupils	Black Pupils		Black Pupils Attending Schools Which Are: 0–49.9% Minority		50.0–79.9% Minority		80–100% Minority	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Continental U.S.									
1968	43,353,568	6,282,173	14.5	1,467,291	23.4	540,421	8.6	4,274,461	68.0
1970	44,910,403	6,712,789	14.9	2,225,277	33.1	1,172,883	17.5	3,314,629	49.4
1972	44,646,625	6,796,238	15.2	2,465,377	36.3	1,258,280	18.5	3,072,581	45.2
32 North & West[a]									
1968	28,579,766	2,703,056	9.5	746,030	27.6	406,568	15.0	1,550,440	57.4
1970	30,131,132	3,188,231	10.6	880,294	27.6	502,555	15.8	1,805,382	56.6
1972	29,916,241	3,250,806	10.9	919,393	28.3	512,631	15.8	1,818,782	55.9
11 South[b]									
1968	11,043,485	2,942,960	26.6	540,692	18.4	84,418	2.8	2,317,850	78.8
1970	11,054,403	2,883,891	26.1	1,161,027	40.3	610,072	21.1	1,112,792	38.6
1972	10,987,680	2,894,603	26.3	1,339,140	46.3	690,899	23.8	864,564	29.9
6 Border & D.C.[c]									
1968	3,730,317	636,157	17.1	180,569	28.4	49,417	7.8	406,171	63.8
1970	3,724,867	640,667	17.2	183,956	28.7	60,256	9.4	396,455	61.9
1972	3,742,703	650,828	17.4	206,844	31.8	54,749	8.4	389,235	59.8

[a] Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming.

[b] Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.

[c] Delaware, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, West Virginia.

SOURCE: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, 48.

have threatened to become increasingly segregated. Certainly, this is the long-term trend in the northern cities, and it is argued that efforts to desegregate schools in those cities have simply served to increase the rate of "white flight." An expert on this subject, Karl Taeuber, has argued that: "Until there is a much more even distribution of blacks and whites among central cities and suburbs, segregation indexes for metropolitan areas cannot fall."[23]

A summary of the educational experiences of blacks would suggest a convergence of school characteristics between those attended by black and white students over the last four or five decades. Based on such measures as teacher salaries, length of school session, attendance patterns, and expenditures, there was a movement towards equality even in the pre-*Brown* era. Since 1954 there seems to have been a continuing dimunition of the gap between schools attended by blacks and those attended by whites for those characteristics that are measurable. With respect to the racial composition of school environments, there has been a strong movement towards desegregation in the South with relatively little movement in the North and a long-run tendency in urban areas towards resegregation in both North and South. In 1972, almost half of all black students were attending schools that were between 80 percent and 100 percent minority according to Table 5.

A final concern on inequalities in educational experiences is the degree to which they have affected such outcomes as student achievement. In this respect we are handicapped in a number of ways. First, long-term studies of student achievement between blacks and whites are not available. Second, although the test scores of black students tend to be lower than white ones, it is not clear that the measures are racially unbiased. Finally, the statistical evidence on the relation between test scores and earnings is weak for both races, but it appears to be virtually nonexistent for blacks on the basis of recent studies.[24] That is, differences in measured achievement seem to have little power in explaining differences in earnings.

CONVERGENCE IN EDUCATION. Based on both the analysis of educational achievement as reflected in the amount of schooling completed and the characteristics of that schooling, it appears that there has been a strong tendency for the education of blacks and whites to converge. However, average educational attainments for black males are still about two or three decades behind those of white males. While school characteristics experienced by the two races have tended to converge, there was still an apparent expenditure gap in favor of whites in 1965–1966, and in 1972 almost two-thirds of blacks were attending schools that had student bodies composed of at least 50 percent minority students. Thus, while substantial equalization in educational attainments and experiences has occurred between the races, according to several measures there still exists a serious gap.

Racial Differences in Earnings

The purpose of this section is to present the relative pattern of earnings for black and white males for the recent past in order to compare this trend with that in education. Before displaying information on this phenomenon, it is important to point out the reasons for restricting the analysis to earnings data for males rather than such alternative measures as family income or income and earnings for both races. As we noted in a previous section, the focus on male earnings is based on the fact that women are less likely to participate in labor markets and are more likely to work on a part-time basis as well as on a periodic basis over their adult years. The result is that historical patterns of earnings data for women will display cultural changes in labor force participation and work patterns that are more likely to confound the interpretation of historical trends in earnings between the two races. In contrast, male labor force behavior tends to be more clearly stable over time.

Second, the analysis will be limited to earnings rather than total income. Total income is derived from both property ownership and from the labor market. Since the direct effect of education on

income will be attributable to its impact on labor earnings of an individual, it is important to restrict the analysis to earnings (which comprise about four-fifths of total income). Finally, it is important to note that the trends that are observed for males may differ considerably from those for females and especially for families. For example, family income depends not only on the earnings and other income of individual breadwinners, but also on the sex and number of breadwinners in the family. Even if there were increasing parity in the earnings and incomes of blacks relative to whites, a relative increase in the number of families that are headed by a single breadwinner and especially a female breadwinner could reduce the incomes of black families relative to white ones. This explains the apparent paradox that although the earnings of both black males and females have risen relative to their white counterparts since 1964, the relative incomes of black families have fallen over part of this period.[25]

Table 6 shows the ratios of median wage and salary income, by race, for years for which data are available between 1947 and 1975. In interpreting this table it is important to recognize that traditionally the relative economic status of blacks has risen and fallen with the vicissitudes of the business cycle. In times of prosperity and high employment, blacks have been more likely to obtain full-time jobs and occupational mobility than when economic conditions were bad, a manifestation of the "last-hired and first-fired" syndrome.[26] Thus, particularly during World War II and the Korean War with their surges in employment levels, blacks advanced economically relative to whites only to fall back in the postwar years.

What is striking about the pattern of earnings is the degree to which relative wages and salaries of blacks have risen since the early sixties. Although even in 1975 the average earnings of black male workers were only about 73 percent of those of their white counterparts, the figure was only 57 percent as late as 1963. Somewhat more encouraging is the fact that there seems to be no evi-

TABLE 6 Ratios for Median Male Wage and Salary Income by Race for Selected Years, 1947–1975

	Wage and Salary Earnings[a]	
	All Workers	Full-Time Workers
	Black Males[b]	Black Males
Year	White Males	White Males
1947	.543	.640[c]
1951	.616	N/A
1955	.688	.635
1959	.580	.612
1963	.568	.654
1967	.639	.675
1969	.666	.694
1973	.695	.719
1974	.709	.736
1975	.734	.769

[a] Data are for all individuals fourteen years old and over.
[b] Black refers to Negro and other races.
[c] Data refers to 1946 urban and rural nonfarm.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports as summarized in Smith and Welch, *Race Differences in Earnings*, 3.

dence of a relative decline in the black/white earnings ratio for the recession of the early seventies, a performance that has defied the traditional movement of earnings between the races over the business cycle.[27] That is, it appears that the upward trend in the late sixties was not merely cyclical.

In summary, the earnings of black males have risen dramatically relative to those of white males, especially since 1963. However, as with the educational pattern, the advantage of whites is still considerable. Further, there exist differences in the black/white earnings ratios of males according to region, education, and age of workers.[28] Table 7 shows such ratios by age and region for

TABLE 7 Black/White Earnings Ratios of Males by Age and Region (All Workers) for Selected Years, 1967–1974

Age	1967	1970	1972	1974
		All Regions		
21–30	.715	.715	.765	.760
31–40	.584	.631	.654	.688
41–50	.558	.580	.622	.628
51–60	.528	.583	.593	.606
21–60	.591	.626	.658	.667
		Northeast		
21–30	.819	.774	.789	.793
31–40	.671	.697	.707	.749
41–50	.616	.680	.606	.706
51–60	.602	.618	.635	.745
21–60	.667	.690	.681	.742
		North Central		
21–30	.834	.855	.806	.738
31–40	.732	.707	.732	.765
41–50	.676	.685	.723	.765
51–60	.627	.764	.744	.734
21–60	.713	.748	.755	.795
		South		
21–30	.637	.631	.729	.688
31–40	.486	.572	.633	.622
41–50	.490	.505	.561	.554
51–60	.481	.512	.530	.511
21–60	.519	.555	.614	.593
		West		
21–30	.781	.830	.906	.783
31–40	.685	.760	.610	.772
41–50	.765	.690	.735	.675
51–60	.678	.730	.619	.630
21–60	.711	.756	.727	.733

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Surveys*, 1968–1975 as summarized in Smith and Welch, *Race Differences in Earnings*, 7.

all workers for selected years from 1967–1974. Among the noticeable patterns are the relatively greater earnings parity among younger workers and within the regions outside the South. Thus, the convergence of earnings between the two races has affected different groups of workers differently, even though the overall movement is toward a closing of the earnings gap.

Education and Other Causes of the Convergence in Earnings

Before exploring the impacts of *Brown* on both education and earnings patterns, it is necessary to assess the possible causes of convergence in earnings in recent years between blacks and whites. Three principal explanations have been posited. First, as the quality and quantity of educational attainments and experiences have converged between the races, labor market productivity (and hence earnings) has also become more nearly equal between blacks and whites. Second, as blacks have migrated from the lower-wage South to other regions of the country, their relative earnings have improved because the wage levels and the rewards for any particular level of education are greater outside the South. The third major explanation is that labor market discrimination against blacks has decreased substantially over time with a resultant improvement in their relative earnings. Let us address each of these in turn.

As we have noted, there has been a long-run tendency for black and white educational attainments and experiences to converge. Economists translate this phenomenon into a straightforward "human capital" explanation for declining earnings differentials.[39] Differences in the quality and quantity of education are assumed to represent human capital investments that create differences in labor productivity. Assuming competitive labor markets with full employment, very large numbers of potential employers and employees, perfect information on alternatives, mobility of factors of production, and profit maximizing behavior among large numbers of competing firms, it is presumed that individuals always receive the value of their contribution to production.

Of course, these assumptions omit the realities of racial discrimination, high levels of unemployment, relatively few employers in a particular labor market, trade unions, minimum wages, and other factors that impede perfect competition. In any event, the implication of the theory is that as the quality of education and the number of years of education have converged between blacks and whites, the relative productivity of blacks has risen and has been translated into higher relative earnings.

The migration explanation is also straightforward. Not only have the relative earnings of blacks been higher outside the South, but the absolute level of earnings has also been considerably higher. This means that a movement from the South to other sections of the country for blacks relative to whites would improve the black/white earnings ratio. At the turn of the century some 90 percent of blacks lived in the South, but by 1970 the proportion was slightly greater than half.[30] Especially between 1940 and 1960 there were significant outflows of blacks from the South to other regions. Likewise, the historical movement of blacks from rural to urban locations, especially within the South, would have a similar effect.

The third explanation is that labor market discrimination against blacks has diminished in the post-1964 period so that occupational opportunities and earnings have improved for blacks relative to whites.[31] It will be recalled that a number of important pieces of civil rights legislation were passed in the early sixties, most importantly the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibited employment and wage discrimination on the basis of race. These laws were both initiated and supported in their implementation by civil rights political activists. Further, a variety of government agencies began to monitor hiring practices generally as well as to enforce policies of nondiscrimination in government hiring and promotions and in industries receiving government contracts.

Which Explanation Is Most Consistent with the Evidence? On the surface, the evidence could easily support more than one

explanation. All the historical changes have taken place simultaneously and in the same direction. That is, the relative improvements in education, the mobility of blacks from rural to urban areas and from the South to other regions, and the pressures to reduce racial discrimination have all been present through the period of analysis. For this reason, effects may be difficult to separate and an advocate of any particular view might weigh more heavily the effects of one trend than another in drawing conclusions. Certainly, this may be true in the present case where some analysts attribute most of the increase in relative earnings of blacks to the improvement in the quality of the black educational experience, while others attribute it to a reduction in labor market discrimination.[32]

In general, it is agreed that the least important explanation for the improvement in relative earnings in the post-1964 period is that of migration. To a large extent the major changes in the regional and urban-rural distributions of blacks had already taken place prior to the midsixties. While these movements are still evident, they have been much more gradual in recent years than the rather precipitous changes of the forties and fifties.

A major recent report has argued that the most important cause of the reduction in the black/white earnings ratio is the convergence in "human capital" between races, especially by way of education.[33] Since blacks have obtained relatively greater increases in educational attainments and educational quality over time with a resultant narrowing of the educational gap between races, it is expected that the ratio of black to white earnings would have risen. Statistical support for this expectation is found in the fact that younger blacks and whites show more nearly equal earnings than do racial comparisons among older groups of males, as reflected in Table 7. Further, even when we view the earnings differential at any particular level of educational attainment between the races, there is a smaller racial difference in earnings between the younger and more recently educated cohorts than among

older cohorts whose educational quality is of a less recent "vintage."[34] It is argued that both these findings would be predicted by the human capital interpretation of racial differentials in earnings. That is, the youngest blacks show "productive" characteristics that are more similar to those of whites than among their older counterparts. Finally, there is some evidence of a rise in the earnings associated with additional education for young blacks at the college level relative to whites, reinforcing the view that the rising quality of black education is improving the relative earnings of black males.[35]

In contrast, the role of diminished wage and employment discrimination is dismissed as a salient explanation. Smith and Welch argue that indirect statistical tests for these effects are not supportive of changes in that relation. While acknowledging that isolated cases may exist in which reductions in discrimination (usually under the threat of legal action) and affirmative action might have been productive in improving the relative status of blacks, the authors assert that there was no widespread effect of any substantial magnitude. These conclusions are drawn on the basis of statistical analyses of the employment and wage patterns of government agencies and those private industries that are seen as most susceptible to government enforcement, firms that derive substantial portions of their sales from government purchases. The authors are neither impressed by their own evidence of rising proportions of blacks in government and private industries that are heavily dependent upon government sales, nor do they find a powerful statistical impact of those situations on the rising black-white earnings ratio. Indeed, they have argued against the validity of earlier studies that showed more powerful statistical evidence of reduced discrimination in accounting for rising black-white earnings ratios.[36]

While these results are plausible, they are not convincing. In fact, a reasonable scrutiny would show that they are internally inconsistent and represent only a selective interpretation of a rela-

tively limited scope, while ignoring evidence that contradicts the human capital explanation. A more complete evaluation tends to support the view that a pervasive reduction in racial discrimination by employers in the late sixties and early seventies seems to dominate the observed patterns, although it is probable that some smaller portion of the equalization was attributable to the convergence in educational patterns between races.

More specifically, the convergence in educational patterns between the races has taken place for at least the last fifty years. For example, Table 3 shows a rather dramatic increase in the length of the school session and attendance of blacks relative to whites from 1920 to 1950, and there is good reason to believe that equalization of other school resources was taking place as well over this period. Further, the amount of schooling that was being completed by males between the two races was converging more rapidly in the decades prior to 1950 than in the subsequent period. If the human capital view is correct, there should have been a concomitant reduction in the earnings gap between the two races following the entry of relatively better educated blacks into the labor market and the earnings convergence should have begun far earlier in this century. Yet, economic historians Fogel and Engerman conclude that "the gap between wage payments to blacks and whites in comparable occupations increased steadily from the immediate post-Civil War decades down to the eve of World War II," and studies of the relative occupational positions of blacks from early in the century until 1960 show no improvement except in the tight labor market situation of World War II.[37] Thus, the human capital interpretation seems to be applied in an *ad hoc* fashion to 1964 and beyond, while ignoring the lack of earnings equalization during the first half of this century when the trend towards educational equalization was much more dramatic.

A second *ad hoc* argument is the support asserted for the human capital interpretation by the rise in returns to blacks for

each year of college relative to whites in the post-1964 period. The human capital theory would predict rising relative earnings of blacks for each year of schooling completed, whether at the elementary-secondary level or college level, as long as there were a convergence of educational quality at both levels between blacks and whites. But the returns to elementary and secondary education between white and black males shifted from a situation of equal additional earnings for each year of elementary and secondary schooling between races in 1967 to a doubling of returns *in favor of whites* by 1974. Instead of the convergence predicted by human capital theory, there was a powerful divergence in the direction of higher white earnings. The 1960–1970 comparisons also show no tendency toward convergence.[38]

Additionally, one must question the literal translation of the higher returns for college training to blacks than to whites in 1970. The human capital explanation would imply that the quality of college experience of blacks had improved so immensely that it exceeded that of whites—that the labor market productivity of blacks with college training was greater than the productivity of their white counterparts. The facts hardly argue for the view that blacks were receiving superior college instruction.[39] A more reasonable interpretation is that black labor market entrants with college training benefited more from the affirmative action efforts in the workplace of the post-1964 period than did blacks with only elementary or secondary school experience.

A third challenge to the human capital explanation is found in Table 7 which presents the black/white earnings ratios of males by age and region. If we examine the 51–60-year-old age group for all regions, we see that the black-white ratio rose from .528 to .606 (an increase of about 15 percent), while the ratio rose for the 21–30-year-old group from .715 to .760 (an increase of only 6 percent). Yet, it is hard to argue that in each successive year the blacks in the older population were obtaining more education relative to their white counterparts. Further, let us assume that

the 51–60-year-olds in 1974 had the same educational composition between races as the 41–50-year-olds had in 1967. That is, by 1974 most of the 41–50-year-old group from 1967 would have joined the 51–60-year-old group. Using the human capital interpretation, we would expect the 51–60-year-old group in 1974 to have the black-white earnings ratio of the younger group some seven years earlier, or .558, by assuming that the higher black-white earnings ratio for the 41–50-year-old cohort in 1967 is due to a closer parity between races in education than one would find for the 51–60-year-olds at that time. But, by the time most of the 41–50-year-olds in 1967 have joined the 51–60-year-olds in 1974, the black-white earnings ratio has risen far beyond .558 to .606. If we attribute the increases in the rate of .030 for the 51–60-year-olds from .528 to .558 to the better educational attainments and experiences of blacks, there is still a larger gap of .048 to be explained by an improvement that is independent of education. That is, at least 60 percent of the gain between 1967 and 1974 in the black-white earnings ratio for 51–60-year-olds cannot be attributed to black gains in education. This fact, in combination with the fact that older cohorts of blacks gained relatively more in this period than younger ones, suggests that an improvement in the position of blacks was far more pervasive than the educational explanation and would be far more consistent with a broad reduction in job discrimination for blacks generally.

Under this interpretation, the lower black-white earnings ratio for older males would be attributable to greater relative discrimination against blacks who are more experienced. At labor market entry, wages and salaries tend to be relatively more equal between races because of the equalizing effects of lower variance in starting salaries, the impact of minimum wages, and the possibility that whites are more likely to enter on-the-job training programs with relatively low wages until their training is completed. Over time the whites are more successful in obtaining occupational mobility and promotions, as much of the discrimination against

blacks takes the form of not placing blacks in supervisory positions over whites. With a reduction in discrimination and an increase in affirmative action, there is improvement in the relative earnings of blacks among all age cohorts, but the basic structure of past discrimination in occupational attainments by race is still reflected in the data.

This interpretation is also reinforced by the fact that earlier studies of occupational attainments and earnings of blacks showed less systematic relations between education and work experience than more recent ones. It is not that blacks simply were receiving lower returns to education and to experience in the pre-1964 period. Rather, these factors seemed to figure less systematically into the determination of labor market success for blacks than for whites, a pattern that is consistent with discrimination against race *per se*. Thus, Hanoch in his study of earnings found highly irregular statistical patterns for blacks relative to whites in the relations between earnings on the one hand and education and age on the other. Duncan and his associates found a similar weakness in attempting to explain occupational attainments of blacks relative to whites in 1962. But, in their data collected in 1973, Featherman and Hauser found that the power of family background variables and schooling to explain occupational attainments of blacks had approached that for whites.[40]

Finally, if much of the improvement of earnings for black males is attributable to a general decline in job discrimination against blacks, the technique of comparing firms that are most susceptible to government-enforced affirmative action with other firms is not an appropriate test. That is, if the values and attitudes of employers towards racial discrimination have been changing throughout the society, then such a comparison will always understate the reduction in discrimination. This problem has long existed in the analysis of the effects of unions on wage levels. If enough firms in an industry are unionized, the nonunion firms may have to raise wages to compete for workers with the union

firms. Accordingly, a comparison of wages between unionized and nonunionized firms may show no difference, even though both sets of firms have higher wages than they would in the absence of unions. If most employers were stimulated by civil rights activity, by antidiscrimination laws, and by basic changes in public opinion into modifying their racial hiring policies, then a comparison of employment and wages—by race—of government agencies and government contractors with other firms may show little difference in racial employment and wage practices.

In summary, it appears that the improvement in the black-white earnings ratios cannot be easily explained by the human capital interpretation, in which most of the gains are attributed to better education. Even when educational experiences were unaltered between races, the gains in favor of blacks were large, and there are many contradictions to the application of the human capital paradigm. Rather, the improvements in the black-white earnings ratio were pervasive and the shift appears to have been an abrupt one coinciding with the intense civil rights activity and passage of major civil rights legislation in the early and middle sixties. In the next section we will explore the possible effects of the *Brown* decision on these changes.

The Impact of Brown

We have noted the comparative improvement in educational attainments and experiences of black Americans over several decades, as well as the dramatic rise in the relative earnings of black males since 1964. I have argued that the particular pattern of convergence of black and white earnings appears to contradict the human capital interpretation that the black economic gains were derived primarily from the educational ones. In this section, we will turn to the role of the *Brown* decision and its impact on both educational and economic changes between the races.

Brown has been viewed traditionally as first and foremost a school desegregation decision. I will call this the orthodox view of

Brown. According to this criterion, the appropriate evaluation of the impact of *Brown* would consist of an assessment of the degree to which it desegregated the schools; the economic, political, and psychological costs of such desegregation; and the impact of the desegregation on student achievement and attitudes, as well as on residential location decisions. I will suggest that much of the present frustration and disillusionment with *Brown* and the recent criticisms of the Warren Court more generally are functions of this narrow social interpretation of the decision.[41]

In contrast, I will suggest a much broader impact of *Brown* by arguing that *Brown* was the catalyst that set off the enormous political, social, and economic changes in race relations of the late fifties and the sixties. I will attempt to trace briefly the nature of the activities that followed *Brown* and their relation to these changes. These include the southern reaction to *Brown*, the rise in black political activism, the passage of civil rights legislation guaranteeing equal access to education, jobs, and housing, and the major improvements in opportunities and outcomes for black Americans, including the shifts in race relations and in public opinions.

Before proceeding, it is important to point out the long history of institutional injustices leading up to the *Brown* decision.[42] Despite the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and of the Reconstruction Act, the South was intent on setting out its own laws which would continue to maintain blacks in subservient positions, economically politically, legally, and socially. Although many blacks had obtained election to political offices in the decade or so following the Civil War, this progress came to an end in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Through the use of the poll tax, literacy tests, the gerrymandering of political districts, physical intimidation, and voting fraud, the black became effectively disenfranchised throughout most of the South. Segregation had become the rule, and the relation of the "freed" blacks to whites was not un-

like that experienced under slavery, with harsh sharecropping and leasing arrangements creating a subsistent and dependent black populace.

Discriminatory laws were given constitutional approval by the well-known decision in *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* in 1896, in which it was decided that separate accommodations for blacks and whites in transportation facilities met the constitutional test as long as such accommodations were similar for each race. Barely more than three decades after emancipation, the highest court of the land had sanctioned the separation of the races and the institutions that were to serve them. Neighborhoods, schools, churches, public places, and transportation facilities were divided along racial lines in which blacks were separated from whites by the official doctrine of the state. The symbol of these separate institutions was the black bird or Jim Crow. The armed forces of the nation were segregated as well as every other public institution, and blacks had access only to the most menial jobs.

In every way the institutions were separate, but they were hardly equal. We noted the inequalities in education that characterized Jim Crow, and these were also reflected in virtually all the other institutions that served blacks. Second-class citizenship was enshrined in the daily experiences of white and black Americans, and many of the stigmas and experiences made their way North where a less formal system of segregated institutions was maintained. The acceptance of the system by both whites and blacks was heavily related to the attitudes and values and consciousness created by a way of life that seemed inevitable by both the dominant and the dominated. And he who violated the system was subject to physical and economic sanctions or worse. Throughout the first four decades of the twentieth century, the changes were few.

With the coming of World War II, labor markets became very tight. Jobs opened for blacks that had not been available before. With the availability of jobs came increased migrations from

rural to urban areas and from South to North. Large numbers of black soldiers served in the armed forces, although in segregated units. Following World War II, blacks began to lose many of the economic and occupational gains obtained during the war, as labor markets slackened. Although the white primary had been declared unconstitutional and black voter registration had risen, most blacks were still without the franchise. President Truman took a few steps toward racial equality by establishing the Committee on Civil Rights and desegregating the armed forces. Yet, Jim Crow was still firmly entrenched. Few of President Truman's proposals from his Committee on Civil Rights emerged from congressional committees, and none was passed. While the stage had been set for massive change, the event or events that would trigger it had not arrived.

Leading up to *Brown*, the early fifties were characterized by a total system of domination, accepted by both whites and blacks, partially because of familiarity and partially because of inevitability and the accompanying belief system that what is familiar and inevitable must not be challenged.[43] And the outrage necessary to provide the momentum for change was not yet evident. In his recent work *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt*, Barrington Moore, Jr. concluded:

> People are evidently inclined to grant legitimacy to anything that is or seems inevitable no matter how painful it may be. Otherwise the pain might be intolerable. The conquest of this sense of inevitability is essential to the development of politically effective moral outrage. For this to happen, people must perceive and define their situation as the consequence of human injustice: a situation that they need not, cannot, and ought not to endure. By itself of course such a perception, be it a novel awakening or the content of hallowed tradition, is no guarantee of political and social changes to come. But without some very considerable surge of moral anger such changes do not occur.[44]

My contention is that the *Brown* decision was central to eliciting

the moral outrage that both blacks and whites were to feel and express about segregation, and this new awareness set the stage for the changes that were to follow.

The initial NAACP attacks on Jim Crow schools started in the thirties. The attempts in those early years were to equalize educational facilities and salaries.[45] That is, the goal was to get the states to live up to the equality component of the "separate but equal" doctrine with the hope that ultimately the state would find the maintenance of an equal, dual school system too costly to maintain. It was expected that the state might seek to integrate the schools as the costs of resource equality for the separate systems mounted. By 1950 it was clear that both the equalization strategy and the integration one were failing, and the NAACP moved directly to constitutional challenges of the segregated institutions themselves.[46]

When the *Brown* decision was announced in 1954 there was great support by northerners, the northern media, and academics, but the decision was met by open statements of defiance and rancor throughout the South. While black expectations for the dismantling of Jim Crow institutions began to rise, the South was planning strategies to resist school desegregation. After fifty-four weeks, the Supreme Court handed down its decision on how *Brown* was to be implemented. Placing enforcement under the aegis of the federal district courts, local school boards were to be given responsibility to desegregate their schools "with all deliberate speed," and the boards could obtain delays if they were necessary in the "public interest."

The language was ideal for the tactics of state and local governments in the South and their substantial numbers of white supporters. Instead of responding to the letter and spirit of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution, the South reacted with a vengeance to any and all black constituents who might push for redress under the law. Local blacks who signed as plaintiffs faced economic sanctions and physical threats, and

night-riders and the Klan reminded the blacks that the old order was not to be destroyed by a decision from a court in Washington, D.C. Blacks were dropped from voting rolls in some states, and all the South sought methods to circumvent the *Brown* ruling.[47] The South was making it clear to blacks that a new day was not dawning, and repression was the solution to any challenge to Jim Crow.

But if blacks could not get the federal Constitution and the NAACP to redress the injustices except through the lengthy process of litigation, a new tactic had to be found. In the anger and frustration of the immediate aftermath of *Brown*, the only response could be direct and collective political action. Six months after *Brown II*, a black seamstress and NAACP member, Rosa Parks, refused to move to the back of a municipal bus to make room for a white passenger. Under the leadership of Mrs. Parks's pastor, Martin Luther King, Jr., the blacks of Montgomery, Alabama, retaliated by staying off the buses to boycott the system.[48] The boycott lasted for over a year, and by its end the Supreme Court had struck down the legal segregation of transportation, overturning the *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* decision of 1896. This was the new media age, with television permeating virtually every community in America. The courage and persistence of the blacks who boycotted the public transportation system of Birmingham had two effects. First, they inspired a new strategy to complement the fruits of litigation, direct political action at a grassroots level.[49] Second, these actions made it very clear to whites outside the South what Jim Crow was about. Most northerners had not grown up in a society where discrimination and repression of blacks were so blatant, for discrimination in the North was much less tied to a formal social contract than an informal one. This morality suggested that blacks must be given equal rights under the law, but prejudice within society was a fact of life that was less assailable.

Thus, a new coalition of blacks and whites emerged to push

for civil rights legislation. And what could not be achieved just a decade before under Truman was accomplished:

> In 1957 Congress passed its first civil rights bill in eighty years, and in the next decade went on to pass three more. Even the barrier of the Senate rules could not restrain the momentum of the Civil Rights movement—propelled by the Supreme Court decision outlawing school segregation, by the nonviolent "Negro revolution," and by instances of white brutality witnessed by an entire nation on television. By 1966 the Negroes' right to equal treatment in most aspects of the national life was established in law—with the notable exception of fair housing legislation which was not enacted until 1968. After that, there remained the harder problem of converting equal rights into truly equal opportunity.[30]

And rising to the challenge of "enforcing" the law were the direct political actions of sit-ins, boycotts, marches, legal challenges, and the use of the media to tell the nation "how it is." The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), which had been at an ebb in 1954 after depletion from McCarthyism and other troubles, began to experience a resurgence.[31] The NAACP had little difficulty in finding plaintiffs to initiate litigation against Jim Crow. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) led new challenges and voter registration drives. The southern blacks had come alive to carry their own fight, and the civil rights movement was in full swing.[32] Northerners joined freedom marches to the South and assisted in voter registration drives, and the southern reaction of indifference, intimidation, or outright brutality just served to cement the public opinion of northern liberals, some white southerners, and blacks throughout the nation as to the righteousness and inevitability of change.

The 1957 Civil Rights Act, which owed its proposal and passage largely to Attorney General Herbert Brownell, provided only for the creation of a Civil Rights Commission with advisory powers,

a Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, and the right of the Justice Department to instigate litigation in behalf of Negroes who were denied their voting rights. In 1960, a second civil rights law was passed broadening the powers of the federal government to protect the voting rights of blacks in the South.[33] By 1961, under John Kennedy and his brother Robert Kennedy, the attorney general, a slightly more vigorous approach was taken toward pushing the civil rights issue. Nonviolent protest as a strategy for change had become firmly entrenched. Student representatives from the southern black colleges were especially active, and while NAACP continued to push at the legal battleline, CORE, SNCC, and SCLC were following the Martin Luther King strategy of nonviolent protest in the form of boycotts, sit-ins, marches, and the picketing of Jim Crow establishments.

By this time an estimated 300,000 persons belonged to the Ku Klux Klan and White Citizen Councils actively opposing any inroads into segregation. Racial violence, murders, beatings, and bombings had become a relatively common hazard for protesters. Yet, the black activists and their allies moved on inexorably with the advent of "freedom rides" and the beginning of desegregation of several southern universities.[34] Black voter registrations increased, and the momentum was clearly on the side of the civil rights groups. By 1963, King felt that the protesters could take on the institutions of a major Jim Crow city, Birmingham, Alabama. The responses to the demonstrations were the brutal bludgeoning of and use of firehoses and police dogs on defenseless children and adults who were marching and singing hymns. The televised brutality of Public Safety Commissioner Bull Connor and the police of Birmingham, as well as the March on Washington of over 200,000 civil rights workers, underlined the urgency for further federal action. In 1964, a third civil rights act was passed with provisions for equal opportunity in employment, equal access to public accommodations, further protection for black voting

rights, and desegregated education. And by 1968 housing discrimination was also prohibited.[55]

With each wave of legislation, the civil rights activists were given more rights to demand and to defend, and the government was provided with agencies to enforce the new laws. Thus, there was a powerful interplay between the three forces of litigation, direct political action, and pressures for new legislation. The legislation of the Great Society further reinforced these changes with its Equal Opportunity Act of 1964 and all of the programs that became known as the War on Poverty.[56] In the schools and in the workplace changes were occurring as local groups pushed for equality and fair employment practices. For example, local civil rights groups in Chicago were able to pressure that city's school authorities into equalizing educational spending among racial groups.[57] Likewise, local civil rights groups initiated litigation and direct political pressures in response to firms and government units that practiced discrimination in employment. These pressures went much further than the acts of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the attempts of the Civil Rights Division or of contracting agencies of the government to reduce discrimination.[58] For example, in the late sixties, black student unions at the major universities pressed successfully for greater numbers of black faculty and administrators—long before the Department of Health, Education and Welfare began to push for racial parity and affirmative action.

What is important to note is that *Brown* had broken the piecemeal paralysis of incremental change by initiating both directly and indirectly the events that would address the entire relation of blacks and whites. As Myrdal emphasized so clearly: "Behind the barrier of common discrimination, there is unity and close interrelation between the Negro's political power; his civil rights; his employment opportunities; his standards of housing, nutrition and clothing; his health, manners, and law observance; his ideals

and ideologies. The unity is largely the result of cumulative causation binding them all together in a system and tying them to white discrimination."[59]

The response to *Brown* addressed this entire *gestalt* and system of relations and institutions. Both the attitudes of blacks towards themselves and their rights and those of whites towards blacks were inexorably altered. Despite the turmoil faced by whites in the demonstrations, urban riots, and school busing, attitudes towards integration by whites became more and more favorable. In 1942 about 44 percent of the white population endorsed integrated transportation, a figure that rose to 60 percent by 1956 and 88 percent by 1970. Although only 4 percent of southerners accepted integrated transportation in 1942, the number rose to 67 percent in 1970. In commenting on this change, the public opinion experts concluded: "In less than 15 years—since Martin Luther King's historic boycott in Montgomery, Ala.—integrated transportation has virtually disappeared as an issue."[60]

In 1942 only 2 percent of whites in the South favored school integration, and by 1956 the figure had risen to only 14 percent. By 1970 almost half the southern white population favored integrated schools. For the nation's whites as a whole the figure rose from about 30 percent favoring integrated education in 1942 to almost 50 percent in 1956, to 75 percent in 1970. These trends are also supported by other public opinion polls that show improving attitudes towards school integration continuing into the seventies.[61]

Although *Brown* did not have the dramatic effect that was expected in desegregating the schools, it has had a powerful effect in many other ways in improving the education and training of black Americans. As we have noted, it created the impetus for the direct political action and solidarity of blacks in demanding improvements from their state and local schools. Second, the tremendous crescendo of civil rights activity that it detonated became a stimulus and backdrop for the large number of educa-

tion and training programs of the War on Poverty and for helping the disadvantaged. Such programs as Head Start, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the expansion of the training programs under the Manpower Development Training Act for blacks and other disadvantaged, the Job Corps, and many other efforts were initiated during the early and middle sixties and have expanded and continued in the seventies.[62] Even the present challenges to the methods by which states finance their schools can be traced to the *Brown* decision. Most of the states have traditionally provided greater educational funding for students in wealthy school districts than in poorer ones, and the constitutional challenge is based heavily upon the "equal protection" arguments in *Brown*.[63]

In summary, the effect of *Brown* has been much wider than just that of school desegregation. It is difficult to conceive of the civil rights movement arising when it did and all of the associated legislative gains of the sixties in the absence of *Brown*. It is equally difficult to conceive of the educational, employment, and earnings gains of blacks without the flurry of protest, litigation, and legislation that *Brown* unleashed. And in the most human terms, it has meant a major transformation in the place of blacks in American society. As Kluger summarized:

> Every colored American knew that *Brown* did not mean he would be invited to lunch with the Rotary the following week. It meant something more basic and more important. It meant that black rights had suddenly been redefined; black bodies had suddenly been reborn under a new law. Blacks' value as human beings had been changed overnight by the declaration of the nation's highest court. At a stroke, the Justices had severed the remaining cords of *de facto* slavery. The Negro could no longer be fastened with the status of official pariah. No longer could the white man look right through him as if he were, in the title words of Ralph Ellison's stunning 1952 novel, *Invisible Man*. No more would he be a grinning supplicant for the benefactions and discards of the master class; no more would he be a party to his own degradation.

He was both thrilled that the signal for the demise of his caste status had come from on high and angry that it had taken so long and first exacted so steep a price in suffering.[64]

A Postscript

I have argued that the major changes in the economic position of black Americans since the early sixties have resulted from the overall impact of *Brown* in altering the nature of race relations rather than its narrow impact on school desegregation. By implication, *Brown* has had a very powerful effect on the functioning of our major social, political, and economic institutions, and the result has been a fairer society. This view contrasts sharply with those who see *Brown* as the classic example of how an "activist" Supreme Court cannot obtain changes that run counter to a deeply rooted system of social beliefs and without a mechanism of the Court to enforce its decisions.[65]

The main difference between my reading of history and theirs is that they tend to concentrate on the "official" purpose of *Brown*. Since *Brown* was ostensibly concerned with the desegregation of schools, they assume that the proof of its effectiveness must be in the extent, speed, and smoothness of the desegregation process. They find the extent of desegregation wanting, the speed of the process a snail's pace, and the nature of the process chaotic and ridden with conflict. What this narrow analysis tends to ignore is the larger impact of *Brown*, which goes far beyond the mere racial composition of student in the schools. I would ask that they answer the following: Is it possible to conceive of the major historical transformations of the late fifties and sixties in the absence of *Brown*? Further, using our hindsight, is there a different strategy that would have had similar effects? These are the key questions that must be raised in evaluating the impact of *Brown* and the role of the decision in bringing a greater measure of equality and justice to black Americans.

A second lesson that this interpretation would emphasize is that

programs of social evaluation must always go beyond the "intended" consequences or the goals of the program or event that is being evaluated. To limit the impact of *Brown* to its effect on desegregation would miss completely the effects of the decision on the changes in political efficacy of blacks, improvements in their economic position, changes in white attitudes towards race, and so on. Evaluations should always start with the question of how the particular program or event changed processes and outcomes in all possible ways rather than only in the direction towards which the program or event was ostensibly tailored.[66]

Finally, the great strides made in the post-*Brown* era are reminders of the changes that *did not* take place as well as of the changes that did. Full equality for black Americans is still far from being achieved.[67] The unemployment rates of black males are double those of white ones, and family income of blacks is only about 60 percent of white families and possibly falling. Educationally, the attainments of blacks are still considerably below those of whites, with especially large differences in high school and college completion. Inequalities in housing opportunities and residential segregation are still a fact of life for blacks, and there seems to be little relief on the horizon. This paper, then, is not a plea for self-congratulations as much as a reminder that *Brown* initiated the first major and systemic phase of change in improving the status of blacks in the post-Reconstruction period. Perhaps some important lessons can be learned from this first stage that will enable persons of good will to carry out the final stage of the movement towards greater equality for blacks and for all Americans.[68]

Notes to EDUCATION AND EARNINGS OF BLACKS AND THE *BROWN* DECISION
*by Henry M. Levin**

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1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

2. For example, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Racial Isolation in the Public Schools* (Washington, D.C., 1967); U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Twenty Years After Brown: Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington, D.C., 1975); U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Fulfilling the Letter and Spirit of the Law: Desegregation of the Nation's Public Schools* (Washington, D.C., 1976); Betsy Levin and Willis Hawley (eds.), "The Courts, Social Science, and School Desegregation," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, XXXIX (Winter/Spring, 1975); Gary Orfield, *Must We Bus?* (Washington, D.C., 1978); Robert Crain, *The Politics of School Desegregation* (Garden City, N.Y., 1969); James Coleman, *et al.*, *Trends in School Segregation, 1968–1973* (Washington, D.C., 1975); Thomas Pettigrew and Robert Green, "School Desegregation in Large Cities: A Critique of the Coleman 'White Flight' Thesis," *Harvard Education Review*, XLVI (February, 1976); David Armor and Donna Schwarzbach, *White Flight, Demographic Transition, and the Future of School Desegregation* (Santa Monica, Calif., 1978).

3. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Racial Isolation*; David Cohen, *et al.*, "Race and the Outcomes of Schooling," in F. Mosteller and Daniel Moynihan, *On Equality of Educational Opportunity* (New York, 1972), 343–70; David Armor, "The Evidence on Busing," *Public Interest* (Summer, 1972), 90–126; David Armor, "The Double Standard: A Reply," *Public Interest* (Winter, 1973), 119–31; Thomas Pettigrew, *et al.*, "Busing: A Review of 'The Evidence,'" *Public Interest* (Winter, 1973), 88–131; Levin and Hawley (eds.), "The Courts, Social Science, and School Desegregation."

4. Levin and Hawley (eds.), "The Courts, Social Science, and School Desegregation"; David Horowitz, *The Courts and Social Policy* (Washington, D.C., 1976); S. Michelson, "For the Plaintiffs—Equal School Resource Allocation," *Journal of Human Resources*, VII (Summer, 1972), 283–306.

5. Philip Kurland, "Equal Eductional Opportunity, or the Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined," in Charles Daly (ed.), *The Quality of Inequality: Urban and Suburban Public Schools* (Chicago, 1968), 47–72; Alexander Bickel, *The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress* (New York, 1970).

6. For a general picture of educational inequalities between blacks and whites, see U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, *Inequalities in the Educational Experiences of Black and White Americans* (Washington, D.C., 1977). A comprehensive analysis of a major data set is Robert Hauser and David Featherman, "Equality of Schooling: Trends and Prospects," *Sociology of Education*, XLIX (April, 1976), 99–120.

7. Reported in Congressional Budget Office, *Inequalities in Educational Experiences*, 28.

8. For reviews of studies that seek to ascertain the relation between school characteristics and educational outcomes, see Harvey Averch, *et al.*, *How Effective is Schooling? A Critical Review and Synthesis of Research Findings* (Santa Monica, Calif., 1972).

9. J. S. Coleman, *et al.*, *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington, D.C., 1966).

10. Horace Mann Bond, *The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order* (New York, 1934); Ambrose Caliver, *Education of Negro Leaders* (Washington, D.C., 1948); John Owen, "The Distribution of Educational Resources in Large American Cities," *Journal of Human Resources*, VII (Winter, 1972), 171–90.

11. See Samuel Bowles and Henry Levin, "The Determinants of Scholastic Achievement—A Critical Appraisal of Some Recent Evidence," *Journal of Human Resources*, III (Winter, 1968), 3–24.

12. For Chicago see Harold Baron, "Race and Status in School Spending: Chicago, 1961–1966," *Journal of Human Resources*, VI (Winter, 1971), 3–24, and for Washington, D.C., see Michelson, "For the Plaintiffs."

13. Owen, "Educational Resources."

14. Coleman, *et al.*, *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, Statistical Appendix; the reanalysis is found in Christopher Jencks, "The Coleman Report and the Conventional Wisdom," in Mosteller and Moynihan, *Educational Opportunity*.

15. Ruby Martin and Phyliss McClure, *Title I of ESEA: Is It Helping Poor Children?* (Washington, D.C., 1969).

16. John Pincus (ed.), *School Finance in Transition* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974).

17. Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, "The American Negro College," *Harvard Educational Review* (Winter, 1967), 3–60. An overall comparison of the black and white college experience is found in Institute for the Study of Educational Policy, *Equal Educational Opportunity for Blacks in U.S. Higher Education: An Assessment* (Washington, D.C., 1976). These comparisons ignore the cultural and symbolic importance of the black colleges.

18. A particularly gloomy picture is painted by Thomas Sowell, *Black Education: Myths and Tragedies* (New York, 1972), Ch. 10.

19. Much of this section is based on U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Equality of Educational Opportunity*. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, at 300 (1955).

20. Reed Sarratt, *The Ordeal of Desegregation* (New York, 1966); U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, 46. Even this figure does not reveal the degree of desegregation. In some states a school was considered to be desegregated if even one white student was assigned to a black school or vice-versa.

21. Coleman, *et al.*, *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, Statistical Appendix, 371. Also see the data in U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Racial Isolation*.

22. Armor and Schwarzbach, *White Flight*; Karl Taeuber, "Racial Segregation: The Persisting Dilemma," *Annals* (November, 1975), 87–96.

23. *Ibid.*

24. See Kan-Hua Young and Dean Jamison, "The Economic Benefits of Schooling and Compensatory Reading Education" (Princeton, N.J., 1974); Irwin Garfinkel, Robert Haveman, and David Betson, "Labor Market Discrimination and Black-White Differences in Economic Status" (Madison, Wis., 1977).

25. For example, between 1965 and 1975 the proportion of black families with female heads of household rose from about 24 percent to 35 percent, while for white families the change was from 9 percent to 10.5 percent. U.S. Department of Commerce, *The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population* (Washington, D.C., 1975), 107. The ratio of median income of black families to white families has actually fallen in the post-1970 period, while earnings of black individuals have risen over this period. Also, the relative incomes of black "husband-wife" families has risen over this period. *Ibid.*, 25, 32.

26. Alan Batchelder, "Decline in the Relative Income of Negro Man," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXVIII (November, 1964), 525–48; Dale Hiestand, *Economic Growth and Employment Opportunities for Minorities*

(New York, 1964); James Tobin, "On Improving the Economic Status of the Negro," in Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark (eds.), *The Negro American* (Boston, 1967), 451–71.

27. See James Smith and Finis Welch, *Race Differences in Earnings: A Survey and New Evidence* (Santa Monica, Calif., 1978), 25–26.

28. See the extensive discussions of these patterns in *ibid*; James Smith and Finis Welch, "Black-White Male Wage Ratios: 1960–70," *American Economic Review*, LXVII (June, 1977), 323–38; J. Haworth, J. Gwartney, and C. Haworth, "Earnings, Productivity, and Changes in Employment Discrimination During the 1960's," *American Economic Review*, LXV (March, 1975), 158–68; R. B. Freeman, "Black Economic Progress After 1964: Who Has Gained?" (Cambridge, Mass., 1977).

29. The seminal work on this subject is Gary Becker, *The Economics of Discrimination* (Chicago, 1971). See the recent challenges to human capital analysis by Mark Blaug, "The Empirical Status of Human Capital Theory: A Slightly Jaundiced Survey," *Journal of Economic Literature*, XIV (September, 1976), 827–55, and by S. Bowles and H. Gintis, "The Problem with Human Capital Theory—A Marxian Critique," *American Economic Review*, LXV (May, 1975), 74–82, and the defense by Finis Welch, "Human Capital Theory: Education, Discrimination, and Life Cycles," *American Economic Review*, LXV (May, 1975), 63–73.

30. Census data presented by Smith and Welch, *Race Differences in Earnings*, 16.

31. For theories of black-white discrimination, see Becker, *Economics of Discrimination*; Lester Thurow, *Poverty and Discrimination* (Washington, D.C., 1969), Ch. 7; Ray Marshall, "The Economics of Racial Discrimination: A Survey," *Journal of Economic Literature*, XII (September, 1974), 849–71; Stanley Masters, *Black-White Income Differentials* (New York, 1975), Ch. 1; Anthony Pascal (ed.), *Racial Discrimination in Economic Life* (Lexington, Mass., 1972); Michael Reich, "The Economics of Racism," in D. M. Gordon (ed.), *Problems in Political Economy: An Urban Perspective* (Lexington, Mass., 1977), 183–88.

32. For example, compare Richard Freeman, "Changes in the Labor Market for Black Americans, 1948–1972," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (Washington, D.C., 1973), I, 67–120, and Freeman, "Black Economic Progress After 1964" with Smith and Welch, "Black-White Male Wage Ratios," and Smith and Welch, *Race Differences in Earnings*.

33. Smith and Welch, *Race Differences in Earnings*. These conclusions are largely extensions of interpretations made in earlier analyses by Welch, "Black-White Returns to Schooling."

34. This relationship is displayed in Smith and Welch, "Black-White Male Wage Ratios," Table 1, 324, and Smith and Welch, *Race Differences in Earnings*, 52.

35. Smith and Welch, *Race Differences in Earnings*, 11 and a comparison of Table A.1, 55 with Table A.2, 59.

36. *Ibid*. 47–50; also see Freeman, "Changes in Labor Market," and Richard Butler and James Heckman, "The Government's Impact on the Labor Market Status of Black Americans: A Critical Review," unpublished, 1977.

37. Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, *Time on the Cross. The Economics of American Negro Slavery* (Boston, 1974), 261; Becker, *Economics of Discrimination*, 149; Hiestand, *Economic Growth*, 51–55.

38. Smith and Welch, *Race Differences in Earnings*, Tables A.1, 55 and A.2, 59, 11.

39. Institute for the Study of Educational Policy, *Blacks in U.S. Higher Education*.

40. Gloria Hanoch, "Personal Earnings and Investing in Schooling" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1965); O. D. Duncan "Discrimination against Negroes," *Annals*, CCCLXXI (May, 1967), 85–103; David L. Featherman and Robert Hauser, "Changes in the Socioeconomic Stratification of the Races," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXXXII (November, 1976), 621–51.

41. For example, see Alexander Bickel, *The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress* (New York, 1970) particularly his assessment of *Brown*. Also see Nathan Glazer, *Affirmative Discrimination: Ethic Inequality and Public Policy* (New York, 1975), Ch. 3, and Kurland, "Equal Educational Opportunity," 60–61.

42. For more detail see John Hope Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of American Negroes* (New York, 1956), and A. Meier and E. Rudwick, *From Plantation to Ghetto* (New York, 1976), Ch. 4–6.

43. This system is well-documented in Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York, 1944).

44. Barrington Moore, Jr., *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (White Plains, N.Y., 1978), 459.

45. Doxey Wilkerson, "The Negro School Movement in Virginia: From 'Equalization' to 'Integration,'" *Journal of Negro Education*, XXIX (Winter, 1960), 17–29.

46. Richard Kluger, *Simple Justice* (New York, 1975), provides an excellent picture of the pre-*Brown* efforts.

47. Sarratt, *Ordeal of Desegregation*.

48. Martin Luther King, Jr., *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story* (New York, 1958).

49. See Howard Zinn, "Nonviolent Direct Action in the South: The Albany Movement," in John Bracey, August Meier, and Elliott Rudwick (eds.), *The Afro-Americans: Selected Documents* (Boston, 1972), 680–99, and Bracey, *et al.* (eds.), *The Afro-Americans*, 709–18, for examples of the new tactics. See Lewis Killian and Charles Smith, "Negro Protest Leaders in a Southern Community," *Social Forces*, XXXVIII (March, 1960), 253–57, for an analysis of the changes in political strategy.

50. James Sundquist, *Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years* (Washington, D.C., 1968), 222.

51. August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, *CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942–1968* (New York, 1973), Ch. 3.

52. Thomas Pettigrew, "Actual Gains and Psychological Losses: The Negro American Protest," in A. Meier and E. Rudwick (eds.), *The Making of Black America* (New York, 1969), 317–33, saw this as arising, in part, from expectations that were changing at a far more rapid rate than institutions.

53. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy*, 222–59.

54. *Ibid.* 238; Meier and Rudwick, CORE, Ch. 5.

55. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy*, 259–86; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Twenty Years After Brown: Equal Opportunity in Housing* (Washington, D.C., 1975), 36–39.

56. Robert Haveman (ed.), *A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs* (New York, 1977).

57. Baron, "Race and Status in School Spending."

58. Phyllis A. Wallace, "A Decade of Policy Developments in Equal Opportunities in Employment and Housing," in Haveman (ed.), *Antipoverty Programs*, Ch. 8; Compendium of federal civil rights enforcement efforts in U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort* (Washington, D.C., 1970).

59. Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, 77.

60. Andrew Greeley and Paul Sheatsley, "Attitudes Toward Racial Integration," *Scientific American*, CCXXV (December, 1971), 13.

61. *Ibid.*, 14; Orfield, *Must We Bus?*, 109.

62. Henry Levin reviews these programs in "A Decade of Policy Developments in Improving Education and Training for Low-Income Populations," in Haveman (ed.), *Antipoverty Programs*, Ch. 4.

63. Arthur Wise, *Rich School, Poor School* (Chicago, 1968); Kurland, *Equal Educational Opportunity*.

64. Kluger, *Simple Justice*, 945–46.

65. Bickel, *Supreme Court*; Kurland, *Equal Educational Opportunity*; Glazer, *Affirmative Discrimination*, Ch. 3.

66. The concept of "goal-free evaluations" has been developed by Michael Scriven; see Scriven, "Evaluation Perspective and Procedures," in W. J. Popham (ed.), *Evaluation in Education* (Berkeley, 1974), Ch. 1.

67. See U.S. Department of Commerce, *Status of the Black Population*, for set of general comparisons between the status of whites and blacks.

68. Certainly a major issue is whether a signal leap forward can be achieved within a reformist framework. The lack of success in improving the distribution of income in American society in light of both the high employment situation of the late sixties and the War on Poverty raises serious questions about the types of changes that are obtainable ultimately within a system of monopoly capitalism. On these issues see Reich, "Economics of Racism"; Andre Gorz, *Strategy for Labor* (Boston, 1968); Lester Thurow, *Generating Inequality* (New York, 1975); David Gordon, *Theories of Poverty and Underemployment*.